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ABSTRACT 
We address recent criticisms of evidential reasoning, an approach to the analysis 
of imprecise and uncertain information that is based on the Dempster-Shafer 
calculus of evidence. 
We show that evidential reasoning can be interpreted in terms of classical 
probability theory and that the Dempster-Shafer calculus of evidence may be 
considered to be a form of generalized probabilistic reasoning based on the 
representation of probabilistic ignorance by intervals of possible values. In particu- 
lar, we emphasize that it is not necessary to resort to nonprobabilistic or subjec- 
tivist explanations to justify the validity of the approach. 
We answer conceptual criticisms of evidential reasoning primarily on the basis 
of the criticism's confusion between the current state of development of the 
theory- mainly theoretical limitations in the treatment of conditional informa- 
tion - and its potential usefulness in treating a wide variety of uncertainty analysis 
problems. Similarly, we indicate that the supposed lack of decision-support schemes 
of generalized probability approaches is not a theoretical handicap but rather an 
indication of basic informational shortcomings that is a desirable asset of any 
formal approximate r asoning approach. We also point to potential shortcomings 
of the underlying representation scheme to treat general probabilistic reasoning 
problems. 
We also consider methodological criticisms of the approach, focusing primarily 
on the alleged counterintuitive nature of Dempster's combination formula, show- 
ing that such results are the result of its misapplication. We also address issues of 
complexity and validity of scope of the calculus of evidence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
If artificially intelligent systems are to produce adequate assessments of the 
state and behavior of the real word, they must cope with information and 
knowledge that is characterized by varying degrees of uncertainty, ignorance, 
and correctness. To address this need, we have developed a technology called 
evidential reasoning. It is formally based upon the Dempster-Shafer [1] 
theory of belief functions, it has been implemented as a domain-independent 
automated reasoning system, and it has been successfully applied to a range of 
real-word problems (Lowrance t al. [2]). Yet, its reliance on belief functions 
has drawn criticism. 
Our choice of an approach based on the Dempster-Shafer theory was not 
arbitrary. We believe that theory confers important methodological advantages, 
such as its ability to represent ignorance in a direct and straightforward 
fashion, its consistency with classical probability theory, its compatibility with 
Boolean logic, and its manageable computational complexity. At the same 
time, we recognize that other approaches may also complement and augment 
the assessments provided by evidential reasoning. 
We examine several criticisms of belief functions that have appeared in the 
literature, discussing first the fundamental theoretical bases supporting the 
belief function approach and justifying its use in terms of the requirements 
imposed by ignorance of certain probability distributions. We consider the 
nature of Dempster's rule of combination and argue that negative assessments 
either misinterpret the nature of the distributions being combined or ignore the 
basic independence assumptions that ensure its validity. We stress also that it is 
not necessary to rely on explanations that are either nonprobabilistic or 
subjective to justify the validity of the Dempster-Shafer calculus of evidence. 
Furthermore, we show that certain apparently counterintuitive properties of 
the approach (e.g., the "spoiled sandwich" paradox) are the natural conse- 
quence of considering families of possible probability distributions that solve 
an approximate reasoning problem. In the context of this discussion, we 
indicate also the inherent pitfalls of "axiomatic" approaches that accept or 
reject methodologies on the basis of their compliance with allegedly intuitive 
principles. 
We also answer critiques based on the computational complexity of the 
belief function approach. Such criticisms claim that the complexity of proba- 
bilistic knowledge representations grows exponentially with the size of the 
frame, thus making the theory unsuited for automated reasoning. Other com- 
ments addressed in our presentation center on limitations on the representa- 
tional ability of belief unctions and the lack of certain methodological capabili- 
ties (e.g., decision-making mechanisms). 
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Despite the criticism that belief functions have drawn, we believe that 
evidential reasoning is well founded and that it may be effectively applied to 
the solution of a broad range of important practical problems. 
Most of our comments will be made in direct reply Pearl's recent criticism 
of the belief function approach [3], because we feel that his paper encompasses 
most of the major worries and concerns expressed about the calculus of 
evidence. Although most of the discussion in this paper consists of direct 
responses to issues raised by Pearl and others, our overall objective is 
considerably broader. Our answers are motivated by the remarks of DeGroot, 
quoted by Pearl at the conclusion of his work, about the need to use our 
methodological pproaches "with the utmost care and in accordance with the 
highest ethical standards." Our aim, like Pearl's, is to enlighten and clarify, 
through careful discussion of rather subtle and delicate issues, rather than to 
engage in dogmatic defense of one approach to the detriment of another. It is 
our earnest hope that this work, in conjunction with other evaluations of the 
belief function approach, will lead to a better understanding of its foundations, 
capabilities, and limitations. 
2. ON THEORETICAL  SOUNDNESS 
The theory of belief functions was originated by Dempster [4] in the context 
of statistical research. The use of the term "bel ief,"  together with its 
subjectivist connotations, is due to Shafer [1], who first applied the theory to 
the analysis of imprecise and uncertain evidence. 
Although much skepticism has been voiced about the naturality of belief 
functions and their agreement with conventional probabilistic approaches, its 
theoretical bases are provided by a simple consideration of the role of evidence 
as a basic information carrier. 
In classical probabilistic treatments, it is assumed that, under certain eviden- 
tial conditions e~, l the value P(plg) of the likelihood of a particular 
statement p is known. This view of evidence, adequate to represent he 
informational conditions of most controlled experimental setups, fails to ade- 
quately model the effects that acquiring similar information has on our state of 
knowledge when the state of the world cannot be so readily manipulated. 
In such circumstances, whenever the evidence * is observed, three possible 
informational outcomes may result from examination of further information 
t Throughout this paper, the symbol d is used to denote available evidence, that is, a collection 
of propositions about he real world that are known to be true either as a result of direct 
observation r as the consequences of applicable background knowledge. 
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that later turns out to improve our state of knowledge: Either p is found to be 
true, ~p is found to be true (i.e., p is false), or such information is 
insufficient o determine the truth value of p. Use of modal logic concepts, 
which are the bases of the formal model of Ruspini [5] suggests the use of the 
notation Kp ,  K~p,  and Ip  to identify these outcomes. Since these alterna- 
fives are exclusive, it is clear that 
P (Kp)  + P (K~p)  + P ( Ip )  = 1. 
Furthermore, since the probability of Ip  may be positive, it will be true, in 
general, that 
P (Kp)  + P(K-~p)  _< 1. 
This model, based on a combination of classical probability methods and the 
modal logic $5 (Hughes and Cresswell [6], Moore [7]), essentially 
provides--through t e logical notation of possible world--a meaning for the 
unary operator K as the representation of the state of knowledge of a 
statistician who is estimating the probability of truth of diverse propositions 
{ p,  q, . . .  } under evidential conditions. 
This statistician estimates those distributions by considering multiple sam- 
ples of the state or behavior of a real-world system. Using, for each sample, 
additional information collected through further experimentation, the statisti- 
cian may then establish or not the validity of a proposition p. If he is rather 
lucky, our statistician will find himself in the ideal situation where he can 
actually "know ''2 or "prove"  that the real world is in a state s that is 
described to the best level of detail that is necessary to understand its behavior 
(i.e., a "possible world"). This is the state of knowledge usually attained, 
under perfect laboratory conditions, when experimental samples are fully 
analyzed and when the outcome of such analyses is classified in terms of a set 
of exhaustive and mutually exclusive alternatives. 
Under less desirable pistemological circumstances, however, the statistician 
will only be able to prove that a less specific proposition q is true. In the 
extreme case where no further information exists, he will be forced to say that 
his knowledge is limited to that provided by the evidence e ~, or that it is 
' ' vacuous .  ' ' 
All samples o analyzed, however, can be classified as to the "most specific 
knowledge" that could be determined in each case. The corresponding proba- 
bility measure of the set e(p)  of samples where the proposition p was the 
most specific knowledge (called an epistemic set by Ruspini) corresponds, in 
2 Note that, in the context of epistemic logics uch as $5, the operator K behaves as a logical 
necessity operator. "Knowing" a proposition simply means that observations logically imply such 
a proposition orthat it is necessarily true. 
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Shafer's framework, to the value m(p) of a mass function m, that is, 
re (p)  = P (e (p) ) .  
Correspondingly, the probability that p was "known" to be true during 
statistical experimentation corresponds to the value Bel(p) of Shafer's belief 
functions, 
Bel(p) : P(Kp) .  
The connection between the ability of our statistician to know that p was 
true and the belief and mass functions that he estimates through experimenta- 
tion justifies both the expression epistemic probability introduced by Ruspini 
[5] to describe the underlying probabilities defined over a particular set of 
situations or scenarios K p (called the epistemic universe) and the description 
of the functions as being "probabilities of provability" or "probabilities of 
necessity" by Pearl [8], following a suggestion by Fagin and Halpern [9]. 
In short, all such interpretations are equivalent to the original model of 
Ruspini, where a rational agent was able to prove the truth of different 
propositions under different information circumstances that were found to 
prevail, during his statistical experiment, with different frequencies of occur- 
rence. 3
Since the ability to prove a proposition q entails the ability to prove any 
proposition p that is implied by q, it should be clear that 
Bel(p) = Y~ re(q), 
q~p 
which is the fundamental equation relating the basic structures of the calculus 
of evidence. It is also true that 
Bel(p) <_ P (p)  <- 1 - Bel(~p),  
providing bounds for the probability of p that may not be improved. This 
ability to manipulate probability intervals by means of the compact representa- 
tion scheme of mass functions is the major reason for the appeal of the 
Dempster-Shafer methodology. 
3 Note, however, that while use of the terms "knowability," 'provability,'" and "'necessity" 
does much to provide adequate semantics to the calculus of evidence, their loose usage leads to 
unnecessary confusion. For example, in his recent criticism [3], Pearl takes some questionable 
semantic license with the term "necessity," mentioning, for example, the probability that a 
decision "will have to be made out of compelling necessity.'" Such "pragmatic" necessity does 
not have anything to do, of course, with the "logical necessity" that underlies the Dempster- Shafer 
theory, that is, the necessary truth of a proposition given available vidence. 
406 E.H. Ruspini et al. 
While the above discussion clarifies the nature of the statistician's knowl- 
edge modeled by belief and mass functions, doubts might still remain as to 
their utility to those who were not involved in their statistical estimation 
process. Such usage is, however, that made of any other probabilistic informa- 
tion. The analyst who observes e ~ does not have the luxury that was available 
to the statistician estimating epistemic probabilities, that is, the ability to 
collect additional information that permits a more detailed characterization f 
the state of the world, for the same reasons that the user of statistical tables is 
unable to utilize the raw data of the estimating statistician. Under such 
circumstances, the analyst is forced to rely on the probabilistic estimates 
provided by the statistician, which are believed on the basis of the assumed 
regularity of the repetitive behavior of the system: the epistemological corner- 
stone of probabilistic reasoning. 
In other words, the "probability of provability" is the best information that 
is available to the analyst; an observation that disposes not only of questions 
about its role in probabilistic reasoning, but also of Pearl's worries about its 
use in lieu of the obviously more desirable "probability of truth" [3]: 
why we should concern ourselves with the probability that the evidence 
implies A, rather than the probability that A is true, given the 
evidence. 
Clearly, we would prefer having the latter, but unfortunately, we can measure 
only the former. 
Our interpretation of the major evidential functions and structures also 
quickly disposes of erroneous arguments based on unintended interpretations of 
the intervals defined by belief functions. Each such interval represents igno- 
rance of a single probability value for a proposition p under fixed evidential 
conditions e ~. If critics choose, for example, to interpret such intervals as the 
possible values that conditional probabilities might attain when further evi- 
dence is collected, as suggested by Pearl [10], belief functions will not, indeed, 
behave according to such unintended semantics. 
In closing this section, it is important to mention other alternative views of 
the structures of the calculus of evidence such as that recently proposed by 
Smets [11], which are based on a nonprobabilistic concept of belief. Although 
those models are interesting on the strength of their own virtues, we still 
emphasize that such interpretations are not required to reconcile the calculus of 
evidence with conventional probability theory. 
In consideration of our ability to reconcile all structures and formulas of the 
calculus of evidence, including Dempster's formula, with conventional proba- 
bility structures, uch as inner and outer probabilities, we do not feel strongly 
compelled to accept alternative epistemic interpretations. Our skepticism in this 
regard is further supported by the observation that, often, such epistemological 
alternatives are the result of misunderstandings about the role of certain 
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evidential formulas and processes (e.g., normalization). For the same reasons, 
we remain unconvinced about the need to assign alternative interpretations to
the structures of calculus of evidence or to its functions, as is the recent 
suggestion of Halpern and Fagin [12], which is echoed by Pearl [3]. 
3. ON DECISION SUPPORT 
A criticism of a more fundamental nature of the calculus of evidence is often 
raised regarding the output of generalized interval-probability approaches. 
Since these methods often fall, because of basic knowledge deficiencies, to 
rank decision choices by the value of some measure that quantifies the 
desirability of each choice (e.g., expected utility), then it is said that they lack 
a decision-theoretic apparatus. 
Although these arguments correctly point to the basic knowledge require- 
ment that most decision problems entail--if a rational choice is to be made, 
then we must have a proper informational basis to do it--this obvious 
consideration is twisted to argue for the necessity to estimate unknown 
probability and utility values when they are not available. We do not think that 
this pragmatic necessity argument is either sound or compelling. 
In our view, the calculus of evidence may be used in a straightforward 
fashion to produce intervals of possible utility values. When such intervals 
overlap and cannot be ordered, this fact simply reflects a basic deficiency in 
our knowledge. We look down upon "pragmatic justifications" with the same 
concern that any experimental scientist must show about proposals to guess 
what he has not measured: The ability to make decisions in the absence of 
knowledge is, in our view, a handicap rather than an advantage of any method. 
Far from lacking a decision-theoretic methodology, our approach provides 
an understandable quantification of the undesirable ffects that poor informa- 
tion has on our decision-making ability, ordering decisions whenever it is 
rationally possible but advising us that such ranking is not possible if our 
knowledge is insufficient. In brief, our approach not only supports decision 
making but, through its built-in sensitivity analysis features, helps us to 
determine what must be done to reach a happier epistemological state. 4
4. ON DEMPSTER'S RULE OF COMBINATION 
The semantic model of the Dempster-Shafer theory also validates the 
so-called Dempster's rule of combination, which permits the combination of 
4 For an example of an approach t at incorporates decision-maker preferences into the frame- 
work of the belief unction calculus, the reader is referred to a recent paper by Strat [13]. 
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belief and mass functions corresponding to different evidential observations 
made under certain conditions of independence. When such conditions are not 
valid, use of this formula leads, of course, to erroneous results, often, although 
incorrectly, considered to be an essential handicap of the evidential reasoning 
approach rather than a consequence of its misapplication. 
The Dempster formula is, currently, the principal evidence integration 
mechanism of the belief function approach. It was derived in the context of a 
basic model of the effect of probabilistic evidence that correctly interprets such 
evidence as constraints on probability values rather than as the source of the 
actual values, which are typically undetermined. It may be described as an 
expression that, under certain conditions of independence, yields bounds for 
the conditional probability distribution P( .  I 6~1, ff2) on the basis of similar 
bounds for the probability distributions P( .  I ffl) and P ( ' I  e~2) • 
To understand the conceptual bases for Dempster's formula of combination 
and its consistence with conventional probability, we resort o a generalization 
of the logical model used before to derive the basic relations of the calculus of 
evidence. Instead of considering a single epistemic operator, corresponding to
a single statistician or observer, we will consider two such rational agents, 
with their knowledge modeled by means of two operators K 1 and K 2. Each of 
these rational agents will be assumed to be ignorant of the knowledge pos- 
sessed by the other, that is, as if they were statisticians performing independent 
experiments under different evidential conditions ~t'~ 1 and  ~° 2 . Their common 
knowledge, however, will be modeled by means of a nonlndexed operator K 
corresponding toa third reliable agent hat aggregates the statistical knowledge 
gathered by the other two. 
Clearly, in a given applicable situation (i.e., the first agent observes dI and 
the second agent observes e*2), the integrating agent, who does not add any 
knowledge of his own, will be able to prove (or to "know" the truth of) a 
proposition p if the other agents provide individual items of information that, 
when combined (i.e., conjoined), imply p, as expressed by the basic combina- 
tion axiom: 
K p is true if and only if there exist sentences p~ and 19 2 such that K~p~ and 
K2P 2 are true, and such that Pl AP2 = 19. 
Using our three operators to generate all possible (i.e., logically consistent) 
states of knowledge that may be attained by each of the three agents while 
assessing the state of a real system, we may say that each of them has, as was 
the case before, knowledge about he real world that may be represented by the 
"most specific ''s propositions p~, P2, and p that each has been able to prove 
(with p being obviously more specific than either 191 or P2)" In the terminol- 
s Note that such most-specific knowledge always exists and is unique xcept for logical 
equivalences because the conjunction f all proved theorems is itself a theorem. 
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ogy of Ruspini's semantic model, each of the agents is in an epistemic state, 
denoted by e(p),  e l(P 1), and e2(P2), respectively, each corresponding to the 
set of all conceivable states of the real world (i.e., possible worlds) having 
such knowledge characteristics. 
The following important set equation relating all of these types of epistemic 
sets as subsets of our enhanced epistemic universe is the basis for the 
derivation of various evidential combination formulas, 
e(p) = U (e,(pl) ne2(p2)) 
PlAP2=P 
of which the Dempster combination formula, 
m(p)=r  E m,(p,)m2(P2), 
plAp2 =p 
where 
m( p) = P( e( p) l el, ~2), 
ml (P l  ) = P(e,(p,)le,), m2(P2) = P(e2(p2) l¢2) 
and where r is a multiplicative factor, is the best known and used. 
Before reviewing the actual process leading to the derivation of Dempster's 
formula, it is important o pause and reflect upon the nature of the above 
set-theoretic equation and its usefulness to derive evidence combination formu- 
las. 
We may first note that this equation has been derived as a relation between 
subsets of possible "epistemological states" that is valid regardless of any 
assumptions about probabilistic structures and their properties (e.g., independ- 
ence). As such, it provides the bases not only for the derivation of Dempster's 
formula but actually for a variety of formulas that bound possible probability 
values within and outside the structures of the Dempster-Shafer theory. 
Basically, this formula provides the basis to extend a probability function P 
that is known over subsets of the form el(p I) and e2(P2) (i.e., over two 
o-algebras), to the set of unions of sets of the form e l (p  l) f3 e2(p2 ) (i.e., 
another o-algebra). If such extension can be made uniquely--as i  the case for 
Dempster's formula--the resulting extension may be used to generate both the 
conditional probability P( - Ig  1, &2) and its associated bounds Bel and P1, 
which are fully compliant with Shafer's axioms. In other less fortunate cases 
(e.g., dependent evidence), such extension is not unique, and the lower 
envelope of the possible extensions, which is not a probability, will lead to 
bounds that do not satisfy the axioms of the calculus of evidence. 
This equation is now being used to extend the evidential calculus approach 
by generalization of the notion of conditional probability by study of the 
410 E.H. Ruspini et al. 
probabilistic relations that define dependencies between the different ypes of 
epistemic sets [i.e., e(p), el(P1), and eE(P2)]. Pearl [3], however, believes, 
apparently as the result of his examination of the role of compatibility 
relations in the calculus of evidence, that this approach is essentially limited in 
its expressive ability to set-theoretic relations between epistemic sets, which 
correspond to classical ogical conditional statements (i.e., material implica- 
tions). 
In fact, it can be easily seen from our epistemic identity that whenever the 
conditional probabilities P(e2(p2)J el(pt)) and P(el(Pl)Je2(P2)) are re- 
stricted to take the values 0 or 1,6 this identity can be used to map one body of 
evidence into another, by means of the compatibility relations that such 
probabilities define. 
Since under these assumptions, however, there can be only one proposition 
P2 for every proposition Pl such that P(e2(P 2) [ el(Pl))  = 1, and vice versa, 
then the compatibility relation that is so defined can be characterized by several 
implications of the form 
and of the form 
e,(p,) = e2(P2 ) 
e2(q2) = e, (q l )  
between knowledge states of one observer and knowledge states of the other 
that are useful to "transfer mass" between propositions. This correspondence 
must be contrasted with that following from the limited interpretation given by 
Pearl, who, from knowledge of 
el(P,) = eE(P2 ) , 
concludes (by contraposition), correctly but narrowly, that 
-~e2(P2) = ~e,(p , )  
and proceeds then to attach all material implication paradoxes (e.g., the 
"ravens paradox") to the calculus of evidence as if they were an essential 
methodological bane. If that were the case--clearly it is not--the same 
concerns should be raised about the use of conditionals in conventional 
probability calculus. 
The second observation that can be made about the nature of evidence 
combination, in general, and the role of our basic set identity to generate 
combination formulas, in particular, is that while the functions to be combined 
6 It can be shown from the definition of epistemic sets that, under such conditions, knowledge of
P( ee( pe) l el( p O ) suffices to derive P( el( pl) J e2(P2)). 
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are conditional probabilities over two different evidential sets 6ol and 6O2 (i.e., 
the evidence observed by two agents), the desired integrated probability is a 
distribution over 6Ol N 6O2 (since we know that both observations are correct). 
Except for unusual cases, however, computation of P ( ' ]  6ol, 6O2) entails a 
"normalizat ion" operation that is fully consistent with the calculus of probabil- 
ity. Most of the normalization "paradoxes"  are the result of misunderstanding 
about what is being combined: two different conditional probabilities rather 
than two different lower and upper bounds of the same probability function.7 
Focusing now on the rationale for Dempster's formula, we should notice 
first that the epistemic sets e l (P l )  and e2(P2) are such that 
e,(p,)  c 6O,, e2(P2 ) c_ 6O2, 
that is, the possible knowledge states of each statistician include awareness of 
the truth of the evidence that is observed by each. Furthermore, 
6Ol = U et(p,) ,  6O2 = U e2(P2), 
Pl P2 
where  P l  ~ 6Ol and 19 2 = 6O2; that is, each statistician knows something that 
implies that his evidential observation is true (otherwise he would not be 
"count ing" that sample). 8
Assume now that there exists a probability distribution P defined over the 
space of all possible epistemic states for our observing statisticians and our 
" integrating" agent. Each such epistemic state is a possible world that 
corresponds to a possible state of the world and to a possible state of 
knowledge for each agent that, in addition, is consistent with the laws of logic. 
We will assume now that, whenever P l = 6ol and P2 = 6O2, 
{P(el(Pl))t  (e2(P2)) if p, Ap 2 * 0 P (e I (P l )  e2(I°2)) 0 otherwise 
This assumption simply states that when 6Om and 6°2 are both true, the 
probability that a rational observer will be in a particular knowledge, or 
epistemic, state does not provide any information about the probability of the 
epistemic state of the other agent (i.e., beyond ruling out logical impossibili- 
ties). In purely formal terms, we may say that knowledge of values of P over 
7 It is fair to say that much of the skepticism raised by the normalization used in Dempster's 
formula can be traced to the exposition given by Shafer [l], which suggests a nonprobabilistic 
method of evidence combination. 
s Recall that our observers, or rational agents, are statisticians e timating properties of certain 
statistical distributions by classifying each sample using their evidence and additional sample-de- 
pendent knowledge. 
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sets of the form el(p 1) does not provide any indication, beyond exclusion of 
logical impossibilities, of the values of P over sets of the form e2(P2) and 
vice versa. The epistemic states of our two agents may be said, therefore, to be 
unrelated in that knowledge of the state of one of our observers (by our 
integrating agent) does not provide any information about he state of the other, 
save for elimination of logical impossibilities. 
Noting now that 
P(e,(p,) )  
P(e ' (P ' ) Ie ' )= P(e,) ' 
P(el(P, ) N e2(p2) l #,, 4 )  = 
P(e2(P2)) 
P(e2(P2) l 2)= P(£2) 
P(e,(p,) De2(P2) ) 
p(  e, n e2) ' 
then, whenever Pl A P2 ¢ (~, 
P( e,( p,) CI e2( P2) l #,e2) = K P( e,( p,) [ e,)P( e2( P2) l e2) 
= Kml(pl)m2(P2 ), 
from which the Dempster's formula readily follows. 
The normalization factor 
P(e,)p(4) 
= P(e ,  n 
has been the object of considerable concern on the part of both skeptics and 
proponents of the calculus of evidence. The above expression, however, 
provides the rationale for its use while disposing of arguments about its alleged 
inconsistence with the probability calculus. In that expression, the denominator 
P(~l  f'l ~2) appears as the consequence of the need to derive probability 
distribution estimates with respect o the intersection of the two observed 
evidences ¢~ and d~2. The numerator of that expression simply reflects the 
need to combine conditional distributions over the same reference set (i.e., the 
epistemic universe) while our probabilistic knowledge is expressed over two of 
its subsets (i.e., d°l and e~2). 
The essence of the conditions that lend validity to the Dempster formula may 
be summarized by saying that the formula's usefulness is confined to the 
limited, but rather important, cases where estimates of probabilistic likelihood 
have been formulated by two rational agents on the bases of independent 
observations while ignoring the evidence available to the other. 
If our integrating agent is thought of as being concerned with estimating the 
probabilities of certain events when both e~ and ~2 are true, then we may say 
that, whenever the conditions validating Dempster's formula hold, knowledge 
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of the fact that a particular sample satisfies p~ tells the agent nothing about he 
likelihood of P2 (unless, of course, P l happens to be logically inconsistent 
with P2). Furthermore, whenever our integrating agent is done with his job, 
he should find out that estimating this joint distribution (i.e., over e~ N e~2) 
could have been accomplished in an easier fashion by estimating the marginal 
distributions over ~l and ~2 and deriving the joint distribution by multiplica- 
tion and normalization. 
Other accounts upporting the validity of Dempster's formula and its consis- 
tence with the probability calculus have been advanced by several authors. A 
particularly compelling justification has recently been given by Wilson [14]. 
5. ON "PARADOXES"  
Criticisms of the Dempster formula may be broadly characterized as being 
the consequence of basic misunderstandings about either its meaning or its 
validity. 
In this section, we examine three alleged paradoxes of the theory, showing 
that the purported inconsistencies are actually the results of conceptual misun- 
derstandings or misrepresentations f the positions of those who, while gener- 
ally supporting the calculus of evidence, are concerned with its possible 
misapplication. 
5.1 The Three Prisoners Problem 
Turning our attention first to concerns about the validity of Dempster's 
formula, we note that, in general, such examples ignore its scope of applicabil- 
ity, producing counterintuitive r sults that are then used to dismiss the method- 
ology as inadequate. Among those, the three prisoners problem discussed by 
Diaconis and Zabell [15] has been perhaps the most quoted and discussed. 
This problem is one of a variety of examples in which the combination 
formula is used as a conditioning formula by assuming that one of the mass 
distributions being combined simply assigns all of its mass to a proposition p
in the frame of discernment. Combination of such a simple support function 
with another mass function associated with a belief function Bel(. ) leads to the 
conditioning formula 
Bel( q l p) = 
Bel(q v ~p) - Bel(~p) 
1 - Bel(-~ p)  
In the particular case of the three prisoners problem, which is concerned 
with the guilt or innocence of a prisoner who has been chosen (by the warden) 
as the guilty party by random draw among three candidates A~, A 2, and A3, 
414 E.H. Ruspini et al. 
our "logical space" or frame of discernment is simply the Boolean algebra 
induced by the three noncompatible propositions 
Prisoner A i has been found guilty 
where i = 1, 2, 3. Since only one of the three prisoners is chosen by the 
warden, we clearly have 
P(Pi) = 1/3, i = 1,2, 3. 
(Note that P is actually a classical, additive, probability distribution.) 
Prisoner A l now asks the jailer to name one of the innocent prisoners (other 
than A i), arguing that such information would clearly be of little help to him 
as an indicator of his potential fate. As Pearl notes, if q stands for the 
proposition "The jailer names A 2 as one of the innocent," then application of 
the conditioning rule leads to the result 
Bel(p, I q) = P / (P l  I q) = 1/2 
indicating that the conditional probability P(p~[q) must be exactly 1/2, 
instead of the "correct solution," 
0 <- P(p,  l q) -~ 1/2, 
while also saying, against he correct intuition of A l, that his chances of guilt 
have been increased as the result of the irrelevant information provided by the 
jailer. From such an observation, Pearl concludes that the formula is seriously 
flawed, both because of the counterintuitive r sult that it produces and for its 
"collapsing" of a family of solutions into a single value. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of Pearl's concerns, we may note, in 
passing, that this problem has been well known as a source of paradoxes and 
incorrect solutions within the scope of the conventional probability calculus 
(Bar-Hillel and Falk [16]) quite independently of any issues of validity of its 
treatment using the Dempster-Shafer calculus. The explanations given to 
describe the conceptual errors leading to incorrect classical treatments resem- 
ble to some extent hose that shed light on the inapplicability of Dempster's 
formula. 
Returning now to the role of Dempster's formula in this problem, we first 
observe that although, at first glance, the distributions representing the jailer's 
and warden's choices seem independent, i  is actually impossible for the jailer 
to tell A l that A 2 is one of those to be spared if all he knows is that the 
Warden is choosing the guilty party by random draw (i.e., he needs to know 
exactly who is the one chosen for punishment). To use the terminology of 
Ruspini's model, the probability of A 2 being named as one of the innocent 
depends on the epistemic state of the warden, thus violating the independence 
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assumptions of Dempster's formula. If  all possible combinations of truth 
values for the propositions Pi, i = 1, 2, 3, and q are tabulated, together with 
their probabilities, as is done in Table 1, then it is clear that 
P(q l  P3) = 1, P(q)  = (1/3)(1 + o~), 
where 0 _< o~ _< 1 represents he unknown probability that the jailer will choose 
to name A 2 rather than A 3 as innocent if A 1 is actually the one chosen by the 
warden as guilty. 
But then, 
P( q l P3) ¢ P( q) 
violating the assumptions, discussed above, that validate the use of Dempster's 
formula [i.e., P(e2(P2)]el(p O) q: P(e2(P2))]. There is not, therefore, 
"total mystery," as Pearl says, as to the incorrect results obtained using 
Dempster's formula. Because it fails to be applicable, there should be little 
wonder that it leads to an apparent paradox. 
Although, as clearly shown by this discussion, the incorrect reatment of the 
three prisoners problem fails to invalidate Dempster's rule of combination, we 
share the concern of Pearl and others about its wide misapplication, particu- 
larly when it is used indiscriminately to generate conditional distributions. In 
our research, we are endeavoring to extend the original theory to produce 
expressions to produce and utilize conditional belief information (Ruspini [17]) 
that incorporates known dependencies between evidential bodies. These formu- 
las are intended to provide better interval estimates than the typically uninfor- 
mative bounds that are supplied by strict derivation of bounds in the absence of 
additional information by the expression 
Bei( p ^ q) 
Bel(ql P) = Be l (p^q)  + P l (p^ ~q) ' 
which is mentioned in Dempster's original paper [4] and that has been the 
object of recent concern by several authors (de Campos et al. [18], Halpern 
and Fagin [12]). 
In closing, we believe it is important o address other concerns of Pearl, 
apparently going beyond the three prisoners problem, about the counterintu- 
Table 1. Possible Worlds in the Three Prisoners Problem 
Possible World Warden's Choice Jailer Identifies Probability 
W I A I A 2 (1/3)c~ 
W 2 A 1 A 3 (1/3)(1 - ¢x) 
W 3 A 2 A 3 1/3 
W 4 A 3 A 2 1/3 
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itive nature of the "collapse" that usage of the Dempster formula often yields, 
which is manifested by production of a single conditional probability distribu- 
tion when conditioning multiple members of a family ~ of probabilities over 
some specific subset q. Just as it is true that all members of the family of 
distributions 
~= {Pt:t  in [0, 1]}, 
defined in the set X = { a, b, c} by the expression 
1/2t,  if x = a, 
Pt(x) = 1/2(1 - t) ,  i fx = b, 
1/2, if x = c, 
are such that Pt({ a, b}) = 1/2, despite their variability over other subsets, it 
is also true that an extensive family of distributions may collapse into a single 
conditional probability without violating any rational or probabilistic princi- 
ples. Such "invariants" are, in fact, desirable as elements that simplify the 
analysis of an otherwise complex probabilistic problem. For these reasons, we 
believe that if Dempster's conditioning formula is applicable, its reduction of 
the variability of probability values should not be a particular cause for concern 
as to its validity. 
5.2. The Spoiled Sandwich 
While discussing the suitability of the calculus of evidence ither as a form 
of generalized probabilistic alculus or as a new theory that intends to capture 
a novel notion of belief, Pearl [3] again faults the approach for failing to satisfy 
the following rationality principle originally stated by Aleilunas [19]: 
If two diametrically opposed assumptions yield two different degrees of 
belief in a proposition Q, then the unconditional degree of belief 
merited by Q should be somewhere between the two. 
As natural as such a principle might look at first, the following simple and 
clever example from Wilson [20] clearly shows that it is neither intuitive nor 
appealing but points instead to the pitfalls of creating or supporting one's 
favorite scheme on the strength of supposedly rational axioms. 
Let X= {a ,b ,c ,d}  with A - {a,b} and B= {a,c}, so that B= 
{ b, d}. Consider the family of probability distributions in X, 
~= {Pt:t in [0, 11}, 
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indexed by a parameter t in [0, 1] and defined by 
Pt({a}) = 1/2t, 
Pt({b}) = 1/2(1 - t) ,  
Pt({c}) = 1/4, 
Pt({d}) = 1/4, 
and let 
Then, clearly, 
p*  = inf{Pt}. 
t 
Pt(A) = 1/2t + 1/2(1 - t) = 1/2, 
and therefore P*(A)= 1/2. The conditional probabilities 
Pt(A [ B) are given by the expressions 
P , (A IB)  = 
Pt({a}) (1/2)t 
Pt({a,c}) 1/4 + 1/2t' 
P t (A l~ ) _  Pt({b}) 
Pt({b,d}) 
1/2(1 - t) 
1/4 + 1/2(1 - t) ' 
from which the lower bounds 
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Pt (A IB)  and 
Although such simple examples hould suffice to dispose of concerns about 
spoiled sandwiches, we feel that Pearl's discussion of the problem deserves a
more detailed analysis, mainly because of its philosophical implications for 
rational thinking. This is particularly important because loose use of such 
terms as "assured winnings," "support," or "belief" in the absence of a 
5.3. Other Ways to Spoil the Sandwich 
P.(AIB ) = in fP t (A IB  ) = O, 
t 
P,(A I B) = infP,(h I ~) -- 0, 
t 
are easily derived. It is clear, however, that 
1/2 = P.(A) > P.(AIB ) = P.(A I B) = 0 
showing that the sandwich principle is violated even within the confines of 
conventional probability theory. 
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sound, formal interpretive framework may quickly mislead those engaged in 
the comparison of alternative methodologies. 
In an example called "the Peter, Paul, and Mary sandwich problem," Pearl 
presents a betting situation in which Mary prepares either a ham or a turkey 
sandwich, promising to pay Paul $1000 should he guess correctly the type of 
sandwich that she has prepared. Not having a clue as to Mary's choice, Paul 
then flips a coin, guessing "ham" if the coin turns up heads and guessing 
"turkey" if it comes up tails. Paul, as Pearl notes, behaves like an "incurable 
Bayesian," reckoning that 
P(win) = P(win [turkey) P(turkey) + P(win [ham) P(ham) 
= P(tails [turkey)o~ + P(heads [ham)(1 - oe) = 1/2 
regardless of the value a of the probability that Mary has actually prepared a
turkey sandwich. Thus, in spite of not being "assured" a win or having 
"supporting evidence," Paul can invoke the rationality (doubtful, as we 
already saw) of the sandwich principle and argue that he does not need to 
engage in unnecessary knowledge acquisition or experimentation [3]: 
If every possible outcome of an experiment would lead you to choose 
the same action, then you ought o choose that action without running 
the experiment. 
From such an observation, Pearl proceeds to fault the philosophical underpin- 
nings of the evidential reasoning approach, eventually going so far as to 
suggest that, should Bayesian orthodoxy be inapplicable, Dempster's formula 
--which, he freely admits, does not play any role in this example--be replaced 
by other formulas such as the well-known bounds recently rediscovered by 
Halpern and Fagin [12]. 
In the light of our previous example about he rather inconvenient ability of 
conventional probability families to spoil sandwiches, all of these pronounce- 
ments look increasingly suspicious. What, however, can we say is wrong? This 
question be answered in two equivalent ways. 
We can say first, keeping ourselves at the informal discussion level, that, 
often, the experiments may interact with probabilities in complex ways that, 
obviously, Pearl has not considered. Nothing in Pearl's formalism suggests, 
for example, that the sandwich as already been prepared and that it may not 
be artfully substituted by Mary to ensure that Paul always loses, thus invalidat- 
ing his hopes of having at least a 50 % chance of winning. 
The second, more formal, rendering of this observation is again based on the 
semantic model of Ruspini. In this, and in other similar problems, we have 
several agents that deliberate about he state of the world on the basis of their 
knowledge and their knowledge of the knowledge of others. If the unary 
operator K represents he state of knowledge of one of these agents, then, as 
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observed before, our agent is always in one of three possible epistemological 
states with respect to the validity of a proposition p: Either he knows that p is 
true (denoted K p) or he knows that p is false (denoted K--, p), or he may be 
ignorant of such truth (i.e., ~K  ^  -,K--,p, denoted Iq).  
In standard accounts, assuming that knowledge of the truth of one proposi- 
tion does not affect the likelihood of truth of other propositions, 9 we are 
simply concerned with a single form of conditional probability: measuring the 
likelihood of p being true when q is true. In more complex epistemological 
situations, we may need to be concerned with such quantities as P(K p [K q), 
P (Kp[  q), P(Kp [Iq), and the like. In other words, Bel(p [ q) measures the 
support hat knowledge of the truth of q provides to the truth of p,  rather than 
the support provided by the truth of q to the truth of p. 
In the Peter, Paul, and Mary sandwich problem, Pearl implicitly assumes 
that 
P(KMAavheads ) = 0 
P(KMARVtails) = 0 
P(turkey IIMARvheads ) = 
P(ham IIMARvheads) = 1 -- ol 
concluding correctly, by application of the total probability law, over the 
exhaustive and exclusive set of possibilities 
{KMARvheads, KMARYtails, IMARvheads} 
that Paul has at least a 50 % chance of winning. 
This correct use of the total probability law does not mean that, by contrast, 
one should assume that the full extent of the conditional information by belief 
functions is limited to the conditional support functions 
BeI(Pl q) = P (P lKq) ,  Bel(Pl~q) = P(p lK -~q)  
as Pearl evidently does. In short, not knowing p is not the same as knowing 
--, p. The example of the Peter, Paul, and Mary sandwich shows that one needs 
to consider states of ignorance that, when properly accounted for, spoil even 
the best-conceived principles of rationality. 
To fully appreciate the complexity of the problem, suppose that we change 
Pearl's implicit assumptions, bringing the previously absent Peter into the 
scene as a spy acting on behalf of Mary. In this new scenario, still consistent 
9 The relations between knowledge and truth are more evident if "knowing" is thought of as 
sensing or observing, and if independence is understood asa lack of relationship between the 
errors of the sensors. 
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with Pearl's explicit statement of the problem, Peter, spying on Paul's coin- 
flipping experiment, alerts Mary, who, being rather artful and deft of hand, 
substitutes the sandwich so as to make sure that Paul always loses. In this case, 
P(ham ]KMARVtails) = 1, P(turkey ]KMARyheads) = 1 
and, most important 
P((KMARyheads ) 13 (KMARyheads)) = 1, 
that is, Mary is never ignorant as to what Paul will bet. 
The Peter, Paul, and Mary sandwich example does not, in our view, 
invalidate the applicability of the evidential approach but rather highlights the 
need to make necessary discriminations between propositional truth, knowl- 
edge of that truth, and the interplay between such conditions that are likely to 
be glossed over by cursory analyses based on conventional pproaches. 
5.4. The Disagreeing Experts 
Another common misunderstanding regarding the role of Dempster's combi- 
nation formula is that provoked by an example of Zadeh [21], which is often 
described as an indication of theoretical inadequacy. This example concerns 
two reliable experts who assess, in a rather conflicting fashion, the likelihood 
of three noncompatible events A, B, and C as shown in Table 2. Representa- 
tion of each of the expert's assessments a a mass distribution followed by their 
combination with Dempster's rule yields P(B) = 1, indicating that the "true" 
event is B, an alternative considered to be rather unlikely by either of the 
assessors. 
Although this example is often quoted as an example of the failure of 
Dempster's rule, it is clear that each of the rows in Table 2 defines a 
conventional probability distribution, thus suggesting that the problem is likely 
to lie elsewhere. While one may be tempted to defend any method of evidence 
combination by saying that the evidence, however peculiar, indicates that 
Observer 1 is ruling out alternative C while Observer 2 is excluding alterna- 
tive A, thus leaving only B as the sole possible answer, it is clear, upon 
further examination, that the rows of Table 2 cannot possibly be evaluations of 
the same probability distribution. If that were the case, then at least one of the 
Table 2. Experts Disagree on the State of the World 
Observer P(A) P(B) P(C) 
1 0.99 0.01 0 
2 0 0.1 0.99 
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Color Size Taste/Edibility Probability 
Red Small Good/edible 99 / 199 
Blue Large Bad/edible 99/199 
Red Large Poisonous 1/99 
experts must be wrong, since there can be only one correct probability 
distribution, contradicting the assumption that they are both reliable. 
Clearly, if the example is to make any sense--under any type of probabilis- 
tic interpretation--each row must correspond to a different conditional proba- 
bility where the conditions correspond to different observations available to 
each expert. A simple example, suggested by a recent example used by Kyburg 
[22] to address other probabilistic reasoning issues, will help to clarify matters. 
In this example we are being asked to reason, on the basis of available 
evidence, about the taste and edibility of certain berries that may be either 
small or large, red or blue, have good or bad taste, and be safe or poisonous to 
eat. We will assume that the berries in question are distributed according to the 
distribution shown in Table 3. If now a berry is picked up and found by an 
expert o be large, he will correctly conclude from such evidence that 
P(good Ilarge) = 0, P(poisonous Ilarge) = 0.01, 
P(bad taste Ilarge) = 0.99. 
Another expert, noticing that the berry is red, will conclude, on the other hand, 
that 
P(good ]red) = 0.99, P(poisonous I red) = 0.01, 
P (bad taste Ilarge) = 0. 
Clearly, the evidential implications of these two separate observations are 
identical to the situation summarized in Table 2. Examination of Table 3, 
however, reveals that 
P(poisonous Ired, large) = 1 
a correct solution that must be rationally expected from any reasoning method 
that purports to be valid. 
The solution to the puzzle of the disagreeing experts lies in recognizing that 
there is, in fact, no disparity of opinion among them. Each is providing 
quantitative measures of likelihood with respect o different reference classes. 
Dempster's formula should never be applied to pool partial information about 
the same probability distribution. Furthermore, as shown by a sensitivity 
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analysis of the results of its application to the berries example, its use in 
situations where there is considerable disparity between reference classes (as 
suggested by the large normalization factor) should be discouraged on the basis 
of practical rather than conceptual considerations. 
6. ON COMPLEXITY AND GENERALITY 
The potential complexity of the belief function approach to represent and 
manipulate interval constraints on a family of probability distributions has 
often been mentioned as a handicap of the evidential reasoning methodology. 
In spite of such misgivings, two major empirical observations have indicated 
that the approach is applicable to a wide variety of practical problems. 
First, our experience shows that, notwithstanding criticisms based on unreal- 
istic worst-case scenarios, the approach is computationally efficient. In particu- 
lar, we have found that representation f belief functions in terms of mass 
functions results in a storage and manipulation scheme that is both economical 
and easy to understand. In addition, we have successfully implemented tools, 
such as summarization a d coarsening operators, that can be used effectively to 
limit representational complexity. 
Second, our current functional operators have been chosen to guarantee that 
the manipulation of evidential knowledge results also in knowledge that can be 
represented in the evidential framework (i.e., the operators are closed). 
The lack of generality of the belief function approach to represent general 
lower upper probability constraints i well known (Kyburg [23]). Our reliance 
on the methodology is primarily the result of practical considerations: Al- 
though we would prefer to manipulate more general constraints on probability 
values, compelling computational efficiency arguments force us to limit the 
scope of the problems considered to those capable of being at least approxi- 
mately solved by a belief function treatment. 
Being, in general, partial toward interpretations of evidential structures that 
are fully compatible with probability theory, our current research is being 
directed toward the development of more general, yet efficient, representation 
and manipulation methods. 
Our current concerns with the manipulation of conditional and dependent 
evidence (i.e., the evidential counterpart of conditional probabilities) how, for 
example, that, for some important problems, the results of evidential combina- 
tion fall outside the scope of its representational c pabilities. In our experience, 
these methodological limitations are more worrisome than any of the suppos- 
edly paradoxical results arising from its misuse or its claimed lack of a 
decision-making apparatus. 
Preliminary results (Ruspini [17]) indicate, on the other hand, that the belief 
function approach can be used to approximate the results of these evidential 
combination operations and that extended representation mechanisms (Spies 
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[24]) may yet be developed to treat more general evidential problems. This 
research also shows the basic errors inherent in criticisms that regard the belief 
function approach as a fully developed methodology incapable of sustaining 
further enhancement and modification. Because it has been studied in depth for 
only 15 years, its technological status is that of a young discipline, being 
capable both of enhancement on its own and of combination with other 
approaches toproduce more general tools for probabilistic reasoning. Far from 
proving that we have reached a technological plateau, our investigations 
indicate that much is yet to be gained from such a development and integration 
process. 
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